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MARQUETTE
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME XVII DECEMBER, 1932 NUM[BEk ONE
DAMAGES, RESPONSIBILITY, AND
LOSS OF PROFITS
VERNON X. MILLER*
T HE process of assessing damages in actions at law is hidden by
"remoteness," "contemplation of the parties," mitigation of dam-
ages," and "uncertainty."' The courts generally do not give it adequate
treatment. A careful comparison of the records in a substantial number
of cases as 'set forth in the reported opinions should give one some
basis for criticism.
The damage problem in every case is the problem of evaluating in-
juries for which the defendant can be held responsible. Several inter-
ests of one or more persons may have been affected by the defendant's
act. His probable responsibility for the injury to each interest should
be separately considered. The problem of fixing responsibility is one
primarily for the trial judge, eventually, perhaps, for the appellate
court. The interests concerned, the injuries thereto, the nature of the
defendant's act, if it is a tort, whether it is wilful, inadvertent, or
* Professor of Law, Marquette University.
IThe approach suggested in this paper is not original. Dean Leon Green in his
Rationale of Proxinmate Cause and his Judge and Jury has presented a detailed
discussion of the problems of responsibility. He has criticized what he calls
the language technic of the courts. The purpose of this paper is to point out
how the process of assessing damages can be separated from the process of
fixing responsibility, and to emphasize that each process must be separately
considered if the courts are to deal intelligently with those cases involving
losses of profits. The idea was suggested to the writer when he was a grad-
uate student under Dean Green at the Yale University Law School.
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grossly careless, what was within the contemplation of the parties, if
it is a breach of contract, suggest to him how far the defendant can be
held responsible. 2 Any disputed questions of fact upon which the de-
termination of responsibility is to be made must be submitted to the
jury. The problem of evaluating the injury or injuries, which are
within the scope of the defendant's responsibility, is primarily a prob-
lem for the jury. The court must be satisfied that there is enough evi-
dence in the record upon which this evaluation can be made. If the
evidence is too "uncertain" or too "speculative" the jury will not be
allowed to consider it.
No extended review of all the possible kinds of damage cases will
be made. Some cases dealing with losses of profits will be used to illus-
trate how plausible the suggested hypothesis can be. That a person
wronged should be compensated for gains prevented as well as for
losses sustained is assumed to be a rule of thumb. One must be skepti-
cal about it. Any rule of thumb is likely to be too general to be of any
practical value. This particular rule does not indicate how or when a
plaintiff can recover for a loss of profits. To know what is meant by a
loss of profits requires a careful analysis to which the rule can give no
help.
TORT CASES
Where the alleged wrong is a tort, one can be reasonably specific
about classifying the interests affected. It is apparent in these cases
that proximate cause concerns the problem of responsibility and is not
a damage factor. It is apparent, too, that there is no simple test to show
when the jury can make an award based upon a loss of profits. The
courts themselves often fail to analyze the cases with enough care to
disclose the particular problems upon which the cases turn. A few ex-
amples can be used to illustrate these suggestions.
A jockey was apprenticed to the plaintiff, a horse trainer.3 The
jockey had been thrown from his horse during a race when the de-
fendant's dog was allowed to wander onto the track. The jockey had
obtained a judgment in a separate action against this same defendant
for personal injuries. The plaintiff hoped to get a verdict and a judg-
ment against the defendant measured by the sum his jockey would
have won for him during the season. The plaintiff was non-suited. The
2Precedents are important, perhaps decisive. Nevertheless, precedents do not
leave the courts without some discretion. The problems of administration,
even in the field of so-called substantive law, are important in every case pre-
senting more than a mere conflict in the evidence. It is just as important to
understand the process of working with the general principles as it is to know
what those principles are.
3 Cain v. Vollmer, 19 Ida. 163, 112 Pac. 686, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 38 (1910).
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judgment on the non-suit was affirmed by the appellate court. The
court said that the damages were too remote and uncertain. Did the
court mean to decide that the injury to this plaintiff's interest was not
within the scope of the defendant's responsibility, or that there was
not enough evidence in the case upon which the jury could reach a
satisfactory verdict? The court said that the evidence was uncertain
because it could not be known how much the jockey would be able to
win during the course of a racing season. If this had been an action
by the jockey himself, average winnings might have been considered
in estimating earning capacity.4 The interest involved in the case was
the master-servant relationship between the plaintiff and his jockey.
The risk of interruption to that relationship was not protected against
the particular conduct of the defendant. There was no damage problem
in the case.
The master's interest in the relationship between himself and his
servant, or employee, is protected against some acts of third parties.
Had the defendant in the case above intended to interfere with the
relationship between the plaintiff and his jockey it is probable that the
employer could have stated a cause of action against him.5 Certainly,
had the defendant, with knowledge of the contract between the plaintiff
and his servant, sought to entice the latter out of his employment, the
plaintiff's interest in the contract would have been protected against
that act.6 How the jury could have evaluated that injury without con-
sidering the possibility of average winnings and the amount thereof
is open to speculation. The master's interest in the relationship between
himself and his apprentice in common law days was protected against
a third party's act which had caused the apprentice to suffer physical
injuries to his person.7 And that was true regardless of the nature of
the act. The master, instead of the parent, was entitled to the earnings
of the apprentice. Possibly the plaintiff had some such idea in mind
when he brought this action. The court in its opinion did not indicate
that the plaintiff ever thought of the analogy.
A traveling man's case of samples was lost through the alleged
negligence of the railroad's employees.8 He sued to recover the value
of the lost goods and for the amount of the commissions he would
4 Compare this statement with the discussion in the text about personal in-
juries and losses of profits.
Cf. Coal Land Development Co. v. Chidester, 86 WV. Va. 561, 103 S.E. 923
(1920).
6 Lumley v. Guy, 2 El. & BI. 216, 118 Eng. Reports 749 (1853); Posner Co.
v. Jackson, 223 N.Y. 325, 119 N.E. 573 (1918).
7Ames v. Union Railway Company, 117 Mass. 541, 19 Am. Rep. 426 (1875).
8 Hines v. Denny, 190 Ky. 416, 227 S.V. 567 (1921).
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have earned had he been able to solicit orders before the new samples
arrived. He had a verdict and a judgment based upon both claims. In
reviewing the case the appellate court decided that the judgment should
have been entered only for the value of the lost goods. The court said
that the trial judge could have peremptorily instructed the jury for the
defendant on the other claim. The record, however, presented no re-
quest for a directed verdict. The defendant had moved for a new trial
which the trial judge should have granted. It is practically impossible
to discover from the opinion whether the court was purporting to deal
with the problem of responsibility, the damage problem, or with both
of them. The court talked about remoteness and uncertainty. But the
court did say that the trial judge could have instructed the jury to
find for the defendant on the matter of the injury to the plaintiff's oc-
cupation. Conceivably that could mean that the court felt that the plain-
tiff could not obtain compensation for that injury no matter how much
evidence he might produce purporting to show a loss of profits. The
damages would be too remote, to use the popular phrase. His interest
in his occupation was not protected against this defendant who was
brought into the case because of the negligence of his servants.
Whether a defendant's act was wilful or inadvertent, whether his
alleged responsibility is based upon some element of fault in him, or
upon some relationship between himself and the active tort-feasor, can
have a material effect upon the scope of the defendant's responsibility.
It is suggested here that such facts do have this effect whether or not
the courts expressly recognize their presence.
Consider again the case of the traveling man's samples. The de-
fendant's responsibility was based not upon his (its) fault but upon
the relationship between himself and his employees. The scope of his
responsibility was narrow. He had only to compensate the plaintiff for
the injury to the latter's property interest in the physical goods. Had
the defendant been an individual who had taken the samples from the
plaintiff, had the tort been a conversion instead of a destruction or loss
through inadvertence, then the injury to the plaintiff's interest in his
occupation might have been found to have been within the scope of
the defendant's responsibility. Nor would it have been necessary to
have shown that the defendant had intended to cause any injury to the
plaintiff in the pursuit of his occupation. Having found that the de-
fendant could be held responsible for the injury to this other interest
then the court would have reached the damage problem. Before letting
the jury assess damages for this injury the court would have insisted
that the plaintiff get into the record enough evidence for the jury to
use in making the evaluation. The plaintiff would have had to show, if
he could, the number of customers he had on his route, what they
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would have bought from him, as estimated from past transactions, and
how much they had purchased from his competitors. Popularly stated
the plaintiff would have been allowed to recover for a loss of profits.
Any number of cases upon close analysis lend color to this sugges-
tion about the nature of the defendant's act. The defendant may have
converted the plaintiff's treshing machine.9 The plaintiff claims that he
is unable to use the machine to thresh grain under contracts that he
has with third parties. The defendant, perhaps, knows nothing of those
other contracts, but this is an intentional tort in that he knowingly has
taken the machine. If the facts are as the the plaintiff claims, if he has
not been able to get another machine, so that the defendant's act is in
fact a cause of his. failure to perform, his interest in the collateral con-
tracts will be protected against that act. In order to get a verdict and
a judgment in his behalf the plaintiff must be able to show definitely
the number of contracts that he had, the return he was to get for his
services, and the amount of grain he would have threshed. That
weather conditions would have aided or hindered performance is ma-
terial in determining the cause of the injury. The plaintiff may even
have had a contract to sell his machine to some third party at a price
above the market value. The interest in that contract will be protected
against the defendant's conversion of the machine. 10 The measure of
damages in such a case is certain and does not have to be estimated. It
is the price he was to obtain on the resale.
The defendant may have converted logs that the plaintiff was to run
through his mill," or he may have converted other goods used by the
plaintiff in his business.' 2 If in fact the carrying on of his business is
9 See the following cases: Cushing v. Seymour, Sabin & Co., 30 Minn. 301, 15
N.W. 249 (1883); Harlin v. Dahlgren, 157 2inn. 100, 195 N.W. 765 (1923);
Cannon v. Oregon-Moline Plow Co., 115 Wash. 273, 197 Pac. 39 (1921);
Truman v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 169 Mfich. 153, 135 N.W. 89
(1912). It is suggested that these cases are decided as they are not because
the collateral interests could not have been within the scope of protection
against the defendants' acts, but because those acts were not the substantial
factors in producing the injuries, or because the plaintiffs were unable to
meet the damage problems.
10 See Cent. of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Cooper, 14 Ga. App. 738, 82 S.E. 310 (1914).
Cf. E. H. Taylor, Jr. & Sons v. Julius Levin Co., 274 Fed. 275 (C.C.A., 6th,
1921).
"1 Quay v Duluth, etc., R. Co., 153 Mich. 567, 116 N.W. 1101, 18 L.R.A. (N.S.)
250 (1908).
12 Preble v. Hanna, 117 Or. 306, 244 Pac. 75 (1926). Cf. Allison v. Chandler, 11
Mich. 542 (1863). The latter was not a conversion case. The interruption to
the plaintiff's business was caused by the defendant's wrongfully evicting the
plaintiff. See also Best Mfg. Co. v. Creamery Co., 307 Ill. 238, 138 N.E. 684
(1923), and DePalma v. Weinman, 15 N. Mex. 68, 103 Pac. 782, 24 L.R.A.
THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
interrupted, if the goods cannot be replaced immediately, the plaintiff's
interest in the business will be protected against that interference. How
can that injury be evaluated? If the plant is a large one, if the show-
ing of daily profits makes it appear that the claim will be a considerable
sum, the court may suggest that the jury evaluate the injury by taking
into consideration the rental value of the mill or factory rather than
the amount of profits the plaintiff would have made. 3 The plan which
the jury must follow in the particular case is that which seems most
satisfactory to the trial judge in the first instance, eventually, perhaps,
that which seems most convenient to the appellate court.
The forceful interfering with the plaintiff in the pursuit of his oc-
cupation,14 the pollution of a stream essential for the use of the plain-
(N.S.) 423 (1909). In neither case was the tort technically an intentional
tort, but it was a common law trespass. When the defendant's act caused the
walls of the plaintiff's building to cave in, the court did not find it difficult
to fix responsibility upon the defendant for the interruption of the plaintiff's
business.
13 Quay v. Duluth, etc. R. Co., 153 Mich. 567, 116 N.W. 1101, 18 L.R.A. (N.S.)
250 (1908). This is not the only type of case where rental value may be sug-
gested as a measure of compensation. The plaintiff's automobile has been
damaged. While the repairs are being made he loses the use of the car. He is
compensated for loss of use. Rental value of the car may be suggested as a
factor to be considered in estimating the compensation for "loss of use."
Allen v. Brown, 159 Minn. 61., 198 N.W. 137 (1924) ; Gould v. -Merrill R. &
L. Co., 139 Wis. 433, 121 N.W. 161 (1909). Cf. Helin v. Egger, 121 Neb. 727,
238 N.W. 364 (1931). It is to be noted, however, that in the automobile cases,
rental value, if it is used, is taken as a measure of the injury to the property
interests in the chattel. In the case referred to in the text, rental value of the
premises is suggested as a measure for an injury to the business in which the
premises are being used. Conceivably the court might suggest that the interest
in the plaintiff's business is not protected against the defendant's act, although
the interest in the use of the premises is, and that the conversion of the logs,
for example, had prevented the plaintiff's using that mill, and that the injury
to the property interest in the mill should be measured by its rental value.
That would make the case depend upon a choice of interests rather than a
choice of measures. Perhaps no court would make such a fine distinction.
Certainly the court in the case discussed was purporting to lay down the
measure to be used in evaluating the injury to the plaintiff's interest in his
business.
'4 Pacific, etc. Co. v. Packers Ass'n., 138 Cal. 632, 72 Pac. 161 (1903) Whitelaw
v. United States, 9 F. (2nd) 103 (N.D., Cal., 1925). Cf. Wright v. Mulvaney,
78 Wis. 89, 46 N.W. 1045, 9 L.R.A. 807, 23 A.S.R. 393 (1890). In the latter
case the defendant's servants negligently ran against the plaintiff's fish nets.
Perhaps there was not enough evidence in the case to enable the jury to
evaluate the injury to the plaintiff's occupation, but it is submitted that the
nature of the defendant's act affected the decision, and that the real reason
that the plaintiff lost the case was because he could show no injury to his in-
terest in his occupation that the court felt could be within the scope of the
defendant's responsibility.
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tiff's cattle, 15 an unlawful combining to restrain trade,16 are torts. Sev-
eral interests of the plaintiff may be injured by the defendant's act. He
may be physically injured or at least physically restrained from carry-
ing on his occupation. There is an injury to his person and an injury to
his business. The lower riparian owner is protected against the pollu-
tion of the stream. But he may have had to sell his dairy business be-
cause the pollution has been so bad. Not merely has the value of the
farm as a piece of land been affected, but the plaintiff's goodwill in his
business has been destroyed. This is more than a temporary interrup-
tion of his business. Ordinary income, expenses, the amount invested,
and such facts, will be relevant to show what his business was worth
before the injury to it. The difference between that sum and what the
plaintiff has in fact realized from the forced sale is what the defendant
will have to pay.17 These claims may be called special damages, and the
plaintiff may have to plead them specially, but the fact remains that the
plaintiff can be compensated for all the injuries to all his interests for
which the court feels the defendant ought to be held responsible.
This fixing of the limits of responsibility is not an arbitrary pro-
cess. The court, of course, does have some discretion. Where the act
is intentional, at least where it is not merely inadvertent, the responsi-
bility of the defendant very likely will be held to cover a collateral in-
jury to the plaintiff's business. On the other hand, where the defend-
ant's servants carelessly deliver kerosene to the plaintiff in place of
gasoline, which the plaintiff unknowingly mixes with his own gasoline
and sells to his customers, the defendant will have to pay the plaintiff
for the gasoline his servants have indirectly spoiled, but he will not
have to compensate him for any injury to the goodwill of the busi-
ness."' The defendant's responsibility is vicarious and is not based upon
his fault. Moreover, the act was inadvertent on the part of the active
tortfeasors. The plaintiff can recover no "special damages." The court
says that the damages are too remote. The result would be the same
15 City of Collinsville, v. Brickey, 115 Okla. 264, 242 Pac. 249 (1925). Cf. Bow-
man v. Helser, 143 Wash. 397, 255 Pac. 146 (1927) ; Mugge v. Erkman, 161
Ill. App. 190 (1911) ; Lawton v. Herrick, 83 Conn. 417, 76 Atl. 986 (1910).
"'States v. Durkin, 65 Kan. 101, 68 Pac. 1091 (1902). Cf. Berry Foundry Co.
v. Moulders' Union, 177 Mo. App. 84, 164 S.W. 245 (1914); Homestead Co.
v. Des Moines Electric Co., 248 Fed. 439, 160 C.C.A. 449 (1918) In these cases
there is no indication that the courts were concerned with any problems of
responsibility. The only interest injured in each case was the interest of the
particular plaintiff in carrying on his business. The talk about certainty and
uncertainty obviously is meant to cover the problem of assessing damages.
17 See City of Collinsville v. Brickey, 115 Okla. 264, 242 Pac. 249 (1925).
Is See Ohio, W. Va. Co. v. Railway Co., 97 W. Va. 61, 124 S.E. 58, 38 A.L.R.
1439 (1924). Cf. Wright v. Mulvaney, 78 Wis. 89, 46 N.W. 1045, 9 L.R.A.
807, 23 A.S.R. 393 (1890).
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even though the plaintiff could get into the record a mass of evidence
upon which the jury could make a comparatively accurate estimate of
the pecuniary injury to the plaintiff's goodwill.
Every case is not going to fit into any prearranged classification. No
doubt many cases can be found where the intent or inadvertence of the
defendant not only is not expressly considered by the court, but where,
even if it is considered, the results so far as responsibility is concerned,
are different from what one would expect them to be. That does not
mean that the hypothesis is neither workable nor practicable. No one
can predict precisely how the courts are going to exercise the broad
administrative discretion which is theirs in fixing the limits of responsi-
bility. What the trial judge does in the first instance may be changed
by the appellate court. Each case can present its special problem. The
exercise of this discretion in the multitude of cases before them gives
the judges an opportunity to apply to everyday affairs their concepts of
social justice, ethics, and good living.19 It is important to appreciate the
factors that influence the courts in making their determinations.
One other group of cases should be considered in connection with
this discussion of tort responsibility. It is often stated that evidence of
profits cannot be considered by a jury where a plaintiff is suing to re-
cover compensation for physical injuries to his person.2 0 Those cases
present a damage problem and only that. The injury which the plain-
tiff has suffered is an injury to his person. He is not trying to get com-
pensation for any injury to an interest in his occupation. But one of
the factors to be considered by the jury in evaluating the physical hurt
is impairment of earning capacity. The particular plaintiff may be de-
riving his income from his own business to which he devotes substan-
tially all of his time. It cannot be doubted that he has an earning ca-
pacity. Unless some consideration is given to the income he has been
deriving from the business that capacity cannot be measured.
The courts as a rule act reasonably under the circumstances. Some
of them may feel that it is dangerous ever to allow a jury to consider
"lost profits" in these cases. 21 Most courts do not adopt that atti-
tude. 22 If the plaintiff has a comparatively small sum invested, if he
19 Dean Green has, in his Judge and Jury, discussed at length a number of the
factors that may affect the excercise of this discretion.
20 See Assessment of Damages in Personal Injury Actions, 14 Minn. Law Re-
view 216, 226 et seq. (1930).
21 Lo Schiavo v. Traction Co., 106 Ohio St. 61, 138 N.E. 372, 27 A.L.R. 424
(1922). Cf. Dempsey v. City of Scranton, 264 Pa. St. 495, 107 Atl. 877 (1919).
22 Galanis v. Simon, 222 App. Div. 330, 225 N.Y.S. 673 (1927) ; Alitz v. Minne-
apolis & St. L. R. Co., 196 Ia. 437, 193 N.W. 423 (1923); Yenney v. Pacific
Northwest T. Co., 124 W*Aash. 660, 215 Pac. 38 (1923). McGlinchey v. Hender-
son, 240 Mass. 432, 134 N.E. 264 (1922). Cf. Mahoney v. Boston Elev. Ry.,
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cahnot hire anyone to take his place without hurting the goodwill, if
the income in fact does appear to represent a return to him because of
his personal services, the court will allow the jury to consider this evi-
dence which purports to show what the plaintiff has been earning in his
business. The court will tell the jury to consider these facts when they
are attempting to estimate the plaintiff's earning capacity and when
they are trying to determine the effect of the injury upon the plaintiff's
power to earn.
CONTRACT CASES
Where the wrong is a tort affecting several interests, the nature of
the act has a material effect upon the limits of the defendant's re-
sponsibility. In the contract cases a factor of relatively similar im-
portance is what the parties have intended to protect by their agree-
ment. In other words, "contemplation of the parties" is a test for re-
sponsibility, and is not a measure of damages. What was within the
contemplation of the parties to the contract is a question of fact. But
it is for the court to determine the effect that fact shall have upon the
scope of the defendant's responsibility. Both parties may not have in-
tended to protect the same interests. What each party in fact did in-
tend is, to repeat, a question of fact. What each party might reason-
ably have expected the other to mean is also a question of fact.2 3 Con-
templation of the parties does not enter into the damage problem, ex-
cept in so far as the determination of the limits of responsibility must
always precede the evaluation of any injury for which the defendant
can be held responsible.
Hadley v. Baxendale,"4 the famous English case, has caused the
greatest amount of confusion in this field by tying the test of contem-
plation of the parties to the damage problem. The facts of the case are
well known. Because the carrier failed to deliver a shaft to the repair
man for the plaintiff within the usual time, the latter had to close his
mill for several days. He sought to charge the defendant with the
amount of profits the mill would have earned during the period of idle-
ness. The court decided that the plaintiff could not collect this sum.
The court said: "It follows, therefore, that the loss of profits here can-
221 M\ass. 116, 108 N.E. 1033 (1915); Weir v. Union Ry. Co., 188 N.Y. 416,
81 N.E. 168 (1907).
23 Where the defendant could have had no reason to believe that that plaintiff
meant to protect, by this agreement, his interests in his other contractual
relationships, see Primrose v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 154 U.S. 1, 14
S. Ct. 1098, 38 L. Ed. 883 (1893). Where obviously neither party had intended
to protect the plaintiff's goodwill by the contract in suit, see American S. L.
Co. v. Riverside P. Co., 171 Wis. 644, 177 N.W. 852 (1920).
24 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Reports 145 (1854).
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not reasonably be considered such a consequence of the breach of con-
tract as could have been fairly and reasonably contemplated by both the
parties when they made this contract. For such loss would neither have
flowed naturally from the breach of this contract in the great multitude
of such cases- occurring under ordinary circumstances, nor were the
special circumstances, which, perhaps, would have made it a reasonable
and natural consequence of such breach of contract, communicated to
or known by the defendants."'2 :
Obviously the court in the English case was dealing with the prob-
lem of the defendant's responsibility, and it treated that problem as a
question of law. The court, in effect, concluded that the plaintiff's in-
terest in the continuous operation of his mill was not protected by the
contract with the defendant carrier. If this interest had been held to
have been within the scope of the defendant's responsibility for the
breach, then the jury would have been allowed to evaluate the partic-
ular injury to that interest. Evidence of ordinary daily income, ex-
penses, and the like, all going to show a loss of profits, would have been
relevant.
The American courts, it would appear, in cases closely analagous to
the Hadley case, have applied the same so-called test and have come to
the conclusion that the plaintiff's interest in his business can be within
the scope of the defendant's responsibility for his breach of contract. 26
Just how the jury and trial judge work together in finding the facts and
reaching a verdict does not always appear in the reported cases. But it
does appear in these cases, that, where the plaintiff can get some evi-
dence into the record upon which a pecuniary estimate can be made,
the verdict does include an award of compensation for the interrup-
tion to the plaintiff's business. When the amount invested in the busi-
ness is a considerable sum, and when the daily profits are large, al-
though there is plenty of evidence to show what the income and ex-
pense would have been, the court may feel that a safer measure for
this sort of injury is the rental value of the premises during the period
when they were not in use.27 The choosing between two possible
measures is pertinent to the damage problem, and contemplation of the
parties does not affect it.28
25 9 Exch. 354, 355, 156 Eng. Reports 151.
26 Griffen v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489, 69 Am. Dec. 718 (1858), is the leading case.
Cf. Ft. Smith & W. R. Co. v. "Williams, 30 Okla. 726, 121 Pac. 275, 40 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 494 (1912) and Elzy v. Adams Express Co., 141 Ia. 407, 119 N.W.
705 (1909). See also McKinnon v. McEwan, 48 Mich. 106, 11 N.W. 828 (1882)
and Allis v. -McLean, 48 Mich. 428, 12 N.W. 640 (1882).
27 Griffin v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489, 69 Am. Dec. 718 (1858); Elzy v. Adams Ex-
press Co., 141 Ia. 407, 119 N.W. 705 (1909).
28 Compare the discussion in note 13, above, with the statement in the text.
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Almost any kind of interest will be protected against the defend-
ant's breach where it was intended by both parties that the interest
should be protected. 1'9 The defendant, for example, may agree to con-
struct a building for the plaintiff on the latter's land. He knows "that
the plaintiff is entering into the contract, and wants him to put up this
building on the particular lot, to bring about an increase in the value
of other lands which the plaintiff owns in the vacinity. Will the in-
terests in the other lands be protected against the defendant's breach
of his contract to construct the building? They ought to be protected
unless it is decided by the court, in spite of the obvious intent of the
parties, that the plaintiff can be compensated only for his "loss" of
bargain. Where the particular land is granted or leased to the defend-
ant and he is to put up a building on it for his own use, the only in-
terests that the plaintiff can have intended to protect are his interests
in his other lots. He has no bargain with the defendant whereby the
latter is to construct a building for him at a stipulated price. The plain-
tiff must be able to show that those interests have been affected by the
defendant's breach, and he must also be able to show the extent to
which those interests have been affected.3 0 The case, however, will
present the problem of evaluating the injuries to those interests. It is
not apparent why the interests in the other land cannot be protected
when the plaintiff has a bargain with the defendant for the construction
of a building on a particular tract of land at a definite price and both
parties in fact have intended to protect all the interests by their agree-
ment.3 '
That a plaintiff must mitigate his damages is another rule of thumb
which the courts propose as a rule for measuring compensation. It is
important to appreciate that when the courts talk about mitigating
damages they are actually dealing with the problem of causation and
not with any damage problem. Disputed questions of fact on this issue
as a matter of course must be submitted to the jury. Any questionable
inferences to be drawn from the facts as found or admitted must be
made by the jury. If there is in the case an alleged injury to some
interest other than the plaintiff's interest in the bargain, it is for the
29 See the following cases: Forbes v. Wyatt, 143 Va. 802, 129 S.E. 491 (1925);
California Mfg. Co. v. Stafford Pack. Co., 192 Cal. 479, 221. Pac. 345, 32
A.L.R. 114 (1923) ; Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co. v. Bradford, 206 Mo.
App. 609, 227 S.W. 628 (1921) ; Metzger v. Brincat, 154 Ala. 397, 45 So. 633
(1908); Wolcott, Johnson & Co. v. Mount, 36 N.J.L. 262, 13 Am. Rep. 438
(1873). See particularly Tague Holding Corp'n. v. Harris, 250 N.Y. 422, 165
N.E. 834 (1929), where the interest in a collateral contract for resale was
protected against the defendant's breach of a contract to convey.
30 Shelley v. Eccles, 283 Fed. 361 (C.C.A., 8th, 1922). Cf. O'Shea v. North
American Hotel Co., 109 Neb. 317, 191 N.W. 321 (1922).
31 Cf. Artwein v. Link, 108 Kan. 393, 195 Pac. 877 (1921).
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court to determine whether the evidence can, or whether it unquestion-
ably does, show that the plaintiff's failure to act was a substantial cause
of that injury. If that fact is found against the plaintiff then the de-
fendant can be held to compensate him for the loss of bargain and for
that alone. If, however, the defendant's breach has been the prime fac-
tor in causing the injury to the other interest, if the plaintiff was not
expected to act, or if his failure to act has had no appreciable effect,
and if protection to that other interest was within the contemplation
of the parties when the agreement was made, then the defendant can
be held resp6nsible for -that injury and it should be evaluated by the
jury.
A few cases will illustrate this suggestion. The defendant has
agreed to extend credit to the plaintiff.12 The plaintiff needs this credit
to finance his purchases of grain on the local exchange.. The defend-
ant has full knowledge of the plaintiff's way of doing business and why
he needs .the credit. The plaintiff contracts. to buy the grain. The de-
fendant refuses to lend. The plaintiff is forced to sell his options im-
mediately at a loss. If he could have procured other credit, but at a
higher rate of interest, in time to finance his purchases, then all that
he can get for this breach will be enough to compensate him for his
loss of bargain, a sum based upon the difference between the two rates
of interest. The damage problem in such a case is simple. If he has
been unable to get credit from anyone and has had to dispose of his
options, he will recover from the defendant a sum measured by the loss
on the resale. Again the damage problem will be an easy one. But the
plaintiff's business may be a well established one. If he is unable to get
credit anywhere else his business may be interrupted. His interest in
his business may be protected against the breach, and the damage prob-
lem in this event will be more difficult to solve. The plaintiff will have
to introduce evidence showing the usual extent of his business, ordi-
nary income, hazards, expenses, and all such facts that any plaintiff
must produce who seeks any compensation for an injury to any busi-
ness interest. The responsibility of the defendant is worked out upon a
consideration of what the parties have intended to protect, and whether
in fact the breach has caused the injury.3'
32 Farabee-Treadwell Co. v. Bank & Trust Co., 135 Tenn. 208, 186 S.W. 92,
L.R.A. 1916 F, 501 (1916).
33 Cf. Shurtleff v. Occidental B. & L. Ass'n., 105 Neb. 557, 181 NA. 374 (1921),
where the defendant broke its agreement to extend credit to the plaintiff
who had undertaken to build an apartment house. See also Sherman Center
Town Co. v. Leonard, 46 Kan. 354, 26 Pac. 717, 26 A.S.R. 101 (1891), where
the defendant broke its agreement to transport the plaintiff's hotel from one
town to another.
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The defendant may have agreed to make repairs upon the plaintiff's
place of business.34 The defendant knows that the repairs must be made
if the plaintiff is to keep his business running. The defendant fails to
perform. The plaintiff cannot then -sit back and hold the defendant
responsible for the interruption of his business when he could have
hired another contractor-to make the same repairs. The defendant-will
have to pay him the difference between the contract price and what it
would have cost the plaintiff to get someone else to. do the job, but
under the circumstances the- defendant will have to pay no more than
that. Only the interest in the bargain has been injured by the defend-
ant's act. The damage problem is a simple one. But the facts may show
that before the plaintiff could hire someone to do the-job, or to finish
it, the business has been interrupted. The defendant's failure to per-
form has caused the injury. That injury must be evaluated. The plain-
tiff will have to get enough evidence into the record upon which the
jury can make some estimate of the amount of business the plaintiff
might have done and what his net income from the business might have
been.
. When the defendant has leased the premises to the plaintiff;rand
has agreed to make specified improvements, the lessee will not be ex-
pected to incur the heavy outlay necessary to pay for these improve-
ments if the lessor fails to perform. 35 If the plaintiff is forced to vacate
and to enter other premises, then the defendant will have to pay him
any difference between the agreed rent and what he has had to pay the
other landlord. 36 He is being compensated for his "loss" of bargain,
providing, of course, he has had to pay the other landlord more than
the contract rental. But the continuous operation of the'plaintiff's busi-
ness may have been interrupted. When the court suggests that the de-
fendant should pay the injured party the difference between the actual
rental value of premises as improved, and the rental value of the prem-
ises in their present condition, it is refusing to meet the problem
squarely.37 If the tenant has in fact been using the premises, if his busi-
ness is being operated in spite of a degree of interference, and in a
34 Compare the following cases with the discussion in the text: Union Cotton
Co. v. Bondurant, 188 Ky. 319, 222 S.. 66 (1920) ; Bush v. Baker, 51 Mfont.
326, 152 Pac. 750 (1915) ; Goebel v. Hough, 26 finn., 252, 2 N.vWr. 847 (1879).
See also the cases set forth in note 35.
33Compare the following cases: Fennin v. Balter, 168 La. 527, 122 So. 716
(1929) ; Johnson v. Inman, 134 Ark. 345, 203 S.W. 836 (1918) ; Chambers v.
Belmore Land & Water Co., 33 Cal. App. 178, 164 Pac. 404 (1917); Ingalls
v. Beall, 68 Wash. 247, 122 Pac. 1063 (1912); Spencer v. Hamilton, 113 N.C.
49, 18 S.E. 167, 37 A.S.R. 611 (1893) ; Farce Bros. v. Gottwald, 149 2finn.
268, 183 N.W. 356 (1918).
36 Cf. Forbes v. Wyatt, 143 Va. 802, 129 S.E. 491 (1925).
3 See particularly Johnson v. Inman, 134 Ark. 345, 203 S.W. 836 (1918).
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suit over the payment of rent, he is allowed credit according to the
suggested measure, the adjustment is being made for the injury to his
interest in his bargain, and not because of any injury to his interest in
the business. If he should be allowed the use of the premises in their
unimproved condition without having to pay any rent, and in addition
to that should get the sum computed according to the court's sugges-
tion, then he would be getting compensation for something more than
the "loss" of bargain.
It is submitted that this would be an inadequate measure of any
injury to the plaintiff's interest in the continuous operation of his busi-
ness If this interest has in fact been injured, then he ought to be able
to show how that business has been affected. The evaluation could be
made with reasonable accuracy in many cases. Perhaps the tenant ought
to be charged for the use of the premises if he has been able to use
them. Concededly, one of the factors to be considered in estimating
what the cost of operation would have been is the agreed rental value
of the premises with the improvements as anticipated. It is not appar-
ent why this interruption to the continuous operation of the plaintiff's
business should not be evaluated like any other similar injury produced
under slightly different circumstances, unless it is because the amount
claimed seems unusually great. Rental value of the premises used in
the business is suggested as an apt measure in other cases where the
plaintiff's business has been interrupted and the profits claimed are
large. Perhaps the court has some such idea in mind here when it sug-
gests the difference in rental values as a measure for the plaintiff's in-
jury. In this type of case the measure is particularly inapt.
Wherever there has been a breach of an exclusive agency contract,
or a breach of a contract for the exclusive showing of films or enter-
tainment, the damage problem is most important.3 The agency or
monopoly has been destroyed. There is no difficulty about injuries to
several interests. Only one interest has been affected, and that is the
plaintiff's interest in his bargain. To give the plaintiff adequate com-
pensation for his "loss" of bargain the jury should be allowed to con-
38 Sales agencies: Buxbaum v. G.H.P. Cigar Co., 188 Wis. 389, 206 N.W. 59
(1925) ; Barnett v. Caldwell Furniture Co., 277 Ill. 286, 115 N.E. 389 (1917) ;
Hirschhorn v. Bradley, 117 Ia. 130, 90 N.W. 592 (1902) ; Entertainment con-
tracts: Lester v. Fox Film Corp'n., 114 S.C. 533, 104 S.E. 178 (1920) ; Orback
v. Paramount Pictures Corp'n., 233 Mass. 281, 123 N.E. 669 (1919); Broad-
way Photoplay Co. v. World Film Corp'n., 225 N.Y. 104, 121 N.E. 756
(1919). These cases all present damage problems. The plaintiff's task in each
case was to introduce enough evidence to show the effect of the defendant's
breach upon the plaintiff's business prospects. Cf. Prejean v. Delaware-
Louisiana Fur Trapping Co., 13 F. (2nd) 71 (C.C.A., 5th, 1926) ; Naraganset
Co. v. Riverside Park etc. Co., 260 Mass. 265, 157 N.E. 532 (1927).
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sider the possible income he would have earned had the defendant con-
tinued to perform. The plaintiff cannot waste his time during the
period the contract was to run. He is expected to do something to earn
a living, he is expected to handle some other product or to show some
other entertainment in his theatre, in other words, he is expected to
mitigate his damages. But the sale of no other product, nor the show-
ing of any other films, will give him the same advantages he would
have enjoyed had the defendant continued to furnish the articles he
had agreed to supply to the plaintiff. It will be necessary for the plain-
tiff to show how much he has made in the past when he had been sell-
ing the defendant's product, or showing his films, the amount of busi-
ness his competitors, the defendant's new agents, have done during the
time when the defendant has been in default, and what he himself has
earned from the sales of other products, or the showing of other films,
during this period. Perhaps he has never shown this brand of films in
his theatre, nor has he ever before sold the defendant's product. The
defendant has broken the contract before the plaintiff has had a chance
to sell or exhibit under it. If he can show the amount of business he
has been doing with the other products, and can also show what his
competitors have done with the defendant's line, and that he and the
competitors have had to meet the same general business hazards, there
will be enough evidence in the case so that the jury can evaluate the
injury. All that is required in any case is that the injured party get
enough evidence before the jury that they may be reasonably accurate
in fixing the amount of compensation he is to receive. The greater the
sum that the plaintiff claims the more strict the court is in requiring
certain and positive evidence to support a verdict in his favor.39
THE CONCLUSION
The vague rules of thumb about "remote consequences," "contem-
plation of the parties," "mitigating damages," and the like, do not help
one to make a realistic analysis of the process of assessing damages.
Several interests may have been affected by the defendant's act in the
particular case under consideration. A careful analysis must be made to
find out what those interests are, how they have been affected, and why
compensation has been, or should be, denied, or awarded to the injured
party. Loss of profits is a phrase which describes nothing in particu-
lar.40 It is usually when the interest concerned is a business interest
that the courts and the parties will be talking about a loss of profits.
39 Cf. Stephany v. Hunt Bros. Co., 62 Cal. App. 638, 217 Pac. 797 (1923).
40 See the opinion of Jaggard, 3., in Emerson v. Pacific Coast & Norway Pack-
ing Co., 96 Minn. 1, 4, 104 N.V. 573, 574, 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 445, 448, 6 Ann.
Cas. 973, 974, 113 A.S.R. 603 605 (1905).
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No method of approach to an understanding and presentation of
the problems in these cases can be perfect. Some systematic attempt at
analysis should be made. It is suggested that the scheme outlined above
can be used to make the analysis of cases already decided a compara-
tively satisfactory process. It is suggested, too, that the cases should
be subjected to some such inquiry during the course of litigation and
before the decisions are handed down.
